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Abstract
The transformation of China’s political elite provides important insights into the nation’s political metamorphosis and the
changes in cadre selection criteria. The current literature explains the composition of Chinese political elites by referenc-
ing cross-sectional biographic data and describing how the revolutionary veterans stepped down and were replaced by
the technocrats who emerged in the 1980s and 1990s. However, explanations for the rise of the technocrats have largely
been limited to socioeconomic factors. By analyzing the longitudinal data of Chinese provincial leaders during the period of
1990–2013, this article shows the rise of technocrats in Chinese politics in the 1990s but also provides an explanation for it
from the perspectives of individuals’ career paths and the contemporaneous political and policy landscapes. These expla-
nations were drawn from analyses of the expansion of higher education and faculty restructuring in the 1950s, graduate
job assignments, the recruitment and promotion of young andmiddle-aged cadres, and the cadre policy known as the Four
Modernizations of the early 1980s. This article presents the interactions among individuals’ career opportunities, group
composition characteristics, and socioeconomic and macropolitical dynamics. It also reveals how the Chinese Communist
Party legitimizes its ruling power and maintains state capacity and political order through elite recruitment.
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1. Introduction
More so than at any time since the founding of the
People’s Republic of China in 1949, there has been an
upsurge of theoretical and practical interest in the study
of Chinese leaders. Because this is an important factor
in China’s elite politics, institutional changes, and socioe-
conomic development, many specialists have rushed to
ask the question of who is running China using empiri-
cal data to present a comprehensive picture of leader-
ship transformation. Scholars have provided substantive
insight into the prevailing norms and prudential rules
of leadership selection, particularly in reform-era China.
They have observed the emergence of technocrats in
Chinese politics since the early 1980s and full-fledged
technocratic leadership in the 1990s (Andreas, 2009; Lee,
1991; Li & White, 1988, 1990, 1998). In the existing lit-
erature, this profound leadership transition is primarily
explained by the increasing demand for highly educated
candidates with technocratic expertise who were meant
to guide China’s rapid industrialization and economic-
modernization projects.
This explanation, however, is far from complete and
leaves open more fundamental questions for empirical
investigation. For example, are technocrats a growing
presence in the Chinese political power structure? How
were technocrats recruited into the party and state hier-
archies? What accounts for the rise of the technocrats?
Did it signal that expertise was favored over Redness
in political competitions for authority positions? If the
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socioeconomic explanation for elite transformation was
complete, thenwhy did not technocrats come to the fore
in the 1950s and the 1960s when the state’s policies
were geared towards industrialization and the nation-
al building agenda relied heavily on technical experts?
(Xu, 2001, p. 67)
This article presents answers to all of these questions
by analyzing empirical data about Chinese provincial
leaders during the period of 1990–2013. This advances
our knowledge of China’s technocrats in threeways. First,
this article will analyze the rise and fall of technocrats
and career bureaucrats in provincial politics from a his-
torical perspective. Second, this article will, for the first
time, interpret the rise of the technocrats by investigat-
ing the opportunities at different time points throughout
the lives of the provincial leaders studied here. It will
seek to explain how technocrats obtained their educa-
tion, professional work experience, and political status.
It will further examine the interactions among individ-
ual career opportunities, elite group composition, and
broader institutional frameworks. Finally, the current lit-
erature generally evaluates the nature and competitive
advantages of technocrats by studying their technocrat-
ic orientation, educational backgrounds, and career pat-
terns. This article will take a step further and analyze the
role of political capital of the technocratic elite through
party membership and occupational experience as par-
ty workers.
The first section of this article presents a review
of the research literature pertaining to Chinese lead-
ership transformation, particularly the technocracy the-
sis. The second section briefly introduces the biographic
dataset of provincial leaders and the operational defini-
tion and measurement of technocrats. The third section
describes the historical changes leading up to the unbal-
anced proportion of technocrats and career bureaucrats
among provincial leaders. In the fourth section, the rise
of the technocrats in the 1990s is explained by reviewing
both the biographies of individual leaders as well as the
socioeconomic and macropolitical dynamics. After sum-
marizing the study’s major findings, this article will con-
clude by discussing the historical necessity for techno-
cratic leadership in China since the early 1980s.
2. Chinese Leadership Transformation and the
Emergence of Technocratic Leadership
The question of who is running China used to be
answered by consulting rumors and hearsay about
supreme leaders or rising political stars during leadership
transitions. Sensibly, the analytical focus has turned to
a general and quantitative account of biographic charac-
teristics of cadres at varying levels ranging from the cen-
tral, provincial, municipal, county, and grass-roots (Bo,
2002, 2008; Feng, 2010; Goodman, 1980; Landry, 2003;
Lee, 1983; Li, 2002; Li & Bachman, 1989; Li & White,
1988, 1998, 2003; Lin, 2012; Zang, 1991, 1993). The grow-
ing consensus in this flourishing area of scholarly inquiry
is that Chinese leadership possesses three essential fea-
tures: male dominance, Han dominance, and increasing
education. Meanwhile, a wave of China scholars is now
paying special attention to the technocraticmovement in
Chinese leadership. However, there is a debate between
those scholars who view Chinese politics as a technocra-
cy and those who view it as a political technocracy.
The rise of China’s technocrats is often traced to the
12th Party Congress of 1982 (Li, 2002; Li & White, 1988,
1990, 1998). After that, the ruling elite was a group of
technically trained leaders with professional job experi-
ence, such as industrial managers, economic planners,
and engineers (Li, 2002, pp. 25–28; Li & White, 1998,
pp. 235–236). Sharing a similar technocratic identity and
a pragmatic orientation (Li & White, 1988, pp. 395–396),
theymaintained leadership unity and stability alongwith
mutual recognition (Li & White, 1998, p. 234). However,
in parallel to this observation, other scholars have specif-
ically rejected the idea of dominance by the technocrats.
Instead, they point out the cooperative coexistence of
technocrats and career bureaucrats; neither group has
absolute authority because they share political power
(Lee, 1983; Zang, 1991, 1993, 1999). As Xiaowei Zang
(1993, p. 801) put it:
The career bureaucrats need the technocrats for their
advice and expertise, and thus need to share power
with them. The technocrats need to cooperate with
the career bureaucrats in order to climb up the politi-
cal hierarchy that has been controlled by the latter.
In this respect, leadership formation is conceived as a
political technocracy instead of just a technocracy (Zang,
1991, p. 123).
What is not debated is the emergence of a techno-
cratic elitewhoweremeant to change howpower is legit-
imized in China and to negotiate the nation’s massive
political and socioeconomic changes (Li & White, 1988,
pp. 395–396, 1990, pp. 12–13, 1998, p. 234). This is seen
as a fundamental response to the demands of modern-
ization, economic prosperity, and technological devel-
opment (Zang, 1993, pp. 789–790). In other words, as
argued by Cheng Li and David Bachman (1989, p. 89):
Under the impact of an accelerating worldwide scien-
tific and technological revolution, technical expertise
should be a basic credential for leadership and a fun-
damental reason for popular support. According to
these leaders, modern society is so complex that only
experts can estimate the implications of a decision.
This scholarly divergence has appeared primarily
because of the relative weakness of the technocratic
elites and the relative strengths of career bureaucrats.
For example, there is a reasonable amount of skepti-
cism that technocrats could effectively cope with com-
plex sociopolitical issues that are different from technical
issues (Li & Bachman, 1989, p. 90). As Cheng Li and Lynn
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White discuss (1990, pp. 20–21):
Social and economic problems sometimes caused by
new policies often occurmore rapidly than themeans
technocrats can devise to deal with them. Their tech-
nical ‘expertise’ is probably even more important as
a legitimacy to justify their rule than as a functional
requisite of their leadership.
Career bureaucrats usually rise from the grassroots, step
by step. They possess broad career experience and accu-
mulate political and human capital in diversified function-
al divisions as well as in party and government organs.
They are relatively advantaged in bureaucratic opera-
tions, specialized knowledge, and experience in gover-
nance. Generally, they have better people skills than
technocrats who have technical jobs and only work with
machines or other highly skilled people. Given these dif-
ferences, it could be argued that career bureaucrats have
co-opted technical professionals into the power center
while hindering the rise of technocrats.
Cheng Li and Lynn White identify 1982 as the water-
shed year for technocratic leadership in China, when
Li Peng, Hu Qili, Jiang Zemin, Wang Zhaoguo, Hu Jintao,
andWuBangguowere elected as Central Committee (CC)
members or alternate CC members (Li & White, 1988,
p. 380). Before 1982, the percentage of technocrat mem-
bers of the 9th, 10th, and 11th CCs was only around 2%.
It increased to 17% in the 12th CC and went up to 20%
in the 13th CC. Based on this evidence, Li and White
(1988) concluded there was an emerging technocratic
leadership in China. Xiaowei Zang (1993, pp. 789–791),
however, pointed out that the proportion of technocrats
was too small to sustain Li and White’s conclusion. Zang
(1993) noted that technocrats accounted for 32.80% of
themembership of the 14th CC,while career bureaucrats
were 40.74%. In another study, Zang (1991) observed
302 central government cadres; the percentages of tech-
nocrats and career bureaucratswere 23.18%and47.02%,
respectively. Zang concluded that technocrats and career
bureaucrats are two important political forces and, thus,
the notion of political technocracy is a better fit for
the composition of China’s leadership. However, in the
15th CC, Li andWhite (1998) noted that at least 55.4% of
full CC members were technocrats.
The empirical studies discussed above suffer from
two limitations:missing data and problematic definitions
of the term technocrat. Li and White (1998, p. 235)
defined technocrats in terms of technocratic major, pro-
fessional occupation, and leadership position. However,
the classification of technocratic majors is ambiguous.
For example, some empirical studies classify the academ-
ic fields of finance, economics, or management as tech-
nocratic majors along with engineering and the natural
sciences; others do not. Furthermore, in most studies,
the percentage of technocrats was calculated by consid-
ering technocratic major and leadership position only,
regardless of professional occupation. The percentage
of technocrats may be overestimated because some
may have had a technocratic major but no profession-
al work experience. The missing-data problem may have
led to measurement errors. Specifically, information was
unavailable for the academic majors of 39.24% of the
cadres in Zang’s investigation of bureaucrats in the cen-
tral government, 36.1% of the members in Zang’s study
of the 14th CC, and 22.0% of the members in Li and
White’s study of the 15th CC (Li & White, 1998; Zang,
1991, 1993).
3. Methods and Data
This article addresses two questions: (1) How the pro-
portion of technocrats has evolved in provincial leader-
ship, and (2) how they assumed political positions. The
data was collected by capturing information about 1,891
provincial party secretaries, governors, deputy party sec-
retaries, and vice governors from1990 to 2013, represent-
ing 85.10% of all provincial leaders for the study period.
Leadership biographies were drawn from diverse, author-
itative sources, such as official government websites,
the leadership databases of Xinhua Net, People.com.cn,
Chinese Economics Net and the like. The leadership pro-
files were cross-checked against the Chinese Political
Elite Database of National Chengchi University of Taiwan.
To trace historical changes and individual leaders, a
provincial leadership dataset was created with a person-
year structure, recording who occupied what provincial
leadership position in each province on a yearly basis.
In this way, the dataset contains 9,814 life-history obser-
vations. Three sets of information were coded to trace
provincial leaders’ life course transitions from school
to work. They include: (1) educational levels, academic
majors, and the time of attaining educational qualifica-
tions; (2) party membership and the time of joining the
Chinese Communist Party; and, (3) previous work expe-
rience in industry, engineering, economic management,
the State-Owned Enterprises (SOE), and party work.
This study adopted Li and White’s (1998,
pp. 235–236) definition of technocrat and Zang’s (1993,
p. 788) definition of career bureaucrat. Career bureau-
crat was defined as a state or party cadre without a tech-
nocratic major working in the party and government sys-
tems, mass organizations, the People’s Liberation Army,
or other agencies. Technocrat was defined by three
dimensions: education, professional occupation, and
leadership position. To avoid definitional ambiguities,
some clarifications and refinements were made for the
measurement details of technocrats. For example, the
previous empirical studies did not distinguish between
full-time and part-time college work and only captured
individuals’ highest educational attainments. The fact is
that the number of college-educated provincial leaders
has grown steadily year-to-year. Among them, the per-
centage majoring in the humanities and social sciences
has increased significantly from 50% in 2000 to 79.64%
in 2012 (Lin, 2017). This trend was paralleled by a sharp
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rise in the percentage of provincial leaders obtaining
part-time college education, up from 29.95% in 2000 to
79.11% in 2013. However, measuring credentials in the
form of the highest educational qualification achieved
results in an underestimation of the number of tech-
nocrats. This study therefore focused only on full-time
college education and traces the entire full-time educa-
tional histories. In addition, technocratic majors were
limited to natural and applied sciences, such as physics,
chemistry, biology, geology, mathematics, engineering,
agriculture, and medical science.
In terms of professional career experience, this study
adopted the measurement strategy of main career pat-
terns used by Cheng Li and David Bachman (1989, p. 75)
and Xiaowei Zang (1993, pp. 797–798), and studied the
frequency and length of job experience. Unlike the previ-
ous empirical studies, specific work experience in indus-
try, engineering, and economicmanagement was consid-
ered. That is, those working in these specialized areas for
ten years or longer were also regarded as potential tech-
nocrats. To summarize, for the purpose of operational-
ization, technocrat was defined as a person: (1) receiving
a degree from a full-time college, or above, in a techno-
cratic major and (2) having a main career pattern, or ten
years’ experience, in industry, engineering, or econom-
ic planning.
4. Historical Changes in Technocrats and Career
Bureaucrats
Of the provincial leaders in the study period of 1990
to 2013, 79.55% received a college education. As indi-
cated in Table 1, among these college-educated leaders,
55.44% were trained in a technocratic major and 38.91%
in the humanities and social sciences. Particularly, provin-
cial leaders studying engineering constituted 38.22% of
the total. The technically trained elites were a larger pro-
portion of the 1990–2013provincial leaders compared to
those who studied the humanities and social sciences.
A technocratic major was only one of the factors ana-
lyzed for technocratic leadership. The next critical step
was to classify and examine career patterns. Technocrats
generally had career experience in industry, engineer-
ing, or economics. As shown in Table 2, only 15.77%
of the elites were recruited into provincial leadership
as professional specialists in industry, engineering, or
economic planning. At the same time, a large number
of career bureaucrats came to power, accounting for
64.32% of all provincial leaders. Party workers account-
ed for 52.45%,whereas government administratorswere
only 8.63%. To take insight into the tenures in industry,
finance and engineering respectively, provincial leaders
with 10-year tenure or longer provide 21.98% in indus-
try, 10.76% in finance and 0.92% in engineering. Taking
both the main career patterns and job tenures in profes-
sional occupations together, 32.26% of provincial leaders
worked as industrial managers, engineers, or econom-
ic planners.
After considering both technocratic majors and rele-
vant career patterns, technocrats accounted for 20.13%
of the 1990–2013 provincial leaders. Among these tech-
nocratic elites, 73.84% acquired professional titles, such
as professor or engineer. From a historical point of view,
there was a fluctuating increase in the percentage of
technocrats, from 26.21% in 1990 to 32.79% in 1996
(Figure 1). From 1997 onward, however, the percent-
age of technocrats continuously declined from 32.54% in
1997 to 9.13% in 2013. The fluctuating increase in tech-
nocrats was accompanied by a fluctuating decrease in
career bureaucrats from 1990 to 1997. As illustrated in
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Table 2.Main career patterns of Chinese provincial leaders, 1990–2013.
Obs. %
Party Work 5,147 52.45
Government Administration 847 8.63















Figure 1, bureaucrats were at 34.46% in 1990, with a
small drop to 28.25% in 1993. Thereafter, the percent-
age of career bureaucrats slightly rose to 30.25% in 1994
and then declined to 26.67% in 1996 and 26.68% in 1997.
The small fluctuation over the period of 1990–1997 was
followed by a consecutive increase from 29.07% in 1998
to 44.59% in 2007. Thereafter, the percentage of career
bureaucrats slowly reached its peak of 45.13% in 2010
and modestly decreased to 37.32% in 2013.
By comparing technocrats and bureaucrats in provin-
cial politics from 1990 to 2013, the percentage of career
bureaucrats dramatically exceeded that of technocrats
during the period of 1990–1991 and from 2000 onwards.






















Figure 1. Technocrats and career bureaucrats in provincial leadership (1990–2013).
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the 1990s, particularly from 1992 to 1999. Despite the
high number of provincial leaders trained in science and
engineering, the data suggests there was no technocratic
dominance in reform China. In reality, the provincial elite
transformation of the period 1990–2013 has turned away
from technocratic leadership. It has alternatively moved
toward a bureaucratic-technocracy characterized by the
relative dominance by career bureaucrats since 2000.
5. Explaining the Rise of Technocrats in the 1990s
How can the rise of technocratic leadership in the
1990s be explained? This question can be divided into
three specific questions. First, where did the college-
educated technical specialists with technocratic majors
come from? Second, how did college-educated technical
specialists acquire professional career experience? Third,
how did technical specialists come to occupy political
positions and become technocrats? The first two ques-
tions seek to understand how the party state nurtured
a highly specialized and science-oriented labor force for
industrialization and state building. The third question
is meant to explain why this group of technical special-
ists were eventually turned into a pool of qualified candi-
dates for political leadership after the introduction of the
cadre policy of the Four Modernizations (ganbu sihua,
干部四化).
5.1. Attending University: Educational Expansion and
Faculty Restructuring
Most of the technocrats in China’s provincial leader-
ship in the 1990s came from the birth cohorts of
the 1930s and the 1940s, accounting for 29.88% and
65.46%, respectively. Those from the same birth cohort
were likely to have experienced the same major his-
torical events and state policy shifts across their lives
(Li, 2002, p. 6). Before the Cultural Revolution, 98.05%
of the 1990s technocrats were admitted into univer-
sity. Among them, a majority received their full-time
college education between 1958 and 1965. The peri-
od of the mid-1950s through the mid-1960s was the
first large-scale expansion of education in the People’s
Republic of China history. The Chinese Communist Party
sought to fight illiteracy and to improve educational cre-
dentials in order to build the state. As early as 1953,
the Cultural and Education Committee of the Central
People’s Government Administration Council placed pri-
mary emphasis on education, particularly higher edu-
cation. According to ‘the Decision on Education Work’
(guanyu jiaoyu gongzuo de zhishi, 关于教育工作的指示)
issued in September 1958, the Chinese Communist Party
made every effort to achieve universal college educa-
tion within 15 years and improve its quality for another
15 years.
Along with educational expansion, faculty restructur-
ing took place in a broad range of universities in China.
In June 1950, Zhou Enlai (1950, p. 19) stressed to the
National Higher Education Conference that restoring eco-
nomic and social order created an urgent need for a
specialized labor force. In November 1951, the National
Conference for Deans of Engineering Faculties laid the
groundwork for a far-reaching faculty restructuring. The
goal of higher education was nurturing technical special-
ists so a reform plan for engineering faculties was pro-
posed. The nationwide faculty restructuring was initiat-
ed in 1952. Its priority was training technical experts and
teachers and developing specialized colleges for indus-
trialization and economic development. After the facul-
ty restructuring of 1953, the number of comprehensive
universities decreased from 49 in 1949 to 14 in 1953.
The number of engineering-oriented universities grew
from 28 in 1949 to 38 and that of normal universities for
teacher training grew from 12 to 33. The percentage of
science-and-engineering-oriented universities had two
remarkable increases before the Cultural Revolution.
The first increase occurred in 1952 when across-the-
board faculty restructuring was launched. Science-and-
engineering-oriented universities accounted for 51% of
the total universities all over China as compared to 38%
in 1951. The second increase occurred in 1958 when the
percentage of science-and-engineering-oriented univer-
sities increased from 49% in 1957 to 62%. At the same
time, the enrollment rate for these specialized universi-
ties grew from 54% in 1949 to 64.5% in 1953. After 1960,
it was over 70% every year and reached its height of
90.7% in 1969.
A vast majority of the 1990s technocrats attended
university during the educational expansion and facul-
ty restructuring of the 1950s. The academic majors they
chosewere in accordwith the regime’s overarching agen-
da for industrial and economic growth. For example,
in order to strengthen national defense, promote eco-
nomic development, and improve living standards, the
First Five-Year Plan (1953–1957) proposed the policy of
industrialization, particularly the development of heavy
industry. The Second Five-Year Plan (1958–1962) con-
tinued the policy of heavy industry, particularly in the
areas of metallurgy, machine production, petrochemi-
cals, power generation, coal, constructionmaterials, and
the like. As for the academic majors of the 1990s tech-
nocrats, 39.96% studied mechanical engineering and
16.75% studied chemical engineering. Those majoring
in steel and metallurgy, civil engineering, and aeronau-
tics and astronautics accounted for 10.28%, 9.61%, and
6.95%, respectively. This empirical evidence supports
the proposition that the academic majors preferred by
technocrats echoed the context of China’s industrializa-
tion and economic policies.
5.2. From School to Work: The Evolving Graduate Job
Allocation Plan
In addition to the education received in the era of far-
ranging educational reforms, technocrats experienced a
particular type of transition from school to work and
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found their places in professional occupations. This ques-
tion is related to their first job and their job tenure in pro-
fessional occupations.
Looking at the 1990s technocrats as a group, 94.01%
received technocratic training from a full-time college
education and a first job in the corresponding profes-
sional field. And, 80.59% of all technocrats embarked on
their professional careers by occupying a highly technical
job at an SOE. Only 4.47% assumed political positions in
the party system or government hierarchies immediate-
ly after college graduation. A vastmajority of technocrats
with SOE job experience remained at the same SOEs or
were transferred to different SOEs in the early- or mid-
1980s. The average SOE tenure was 16.15 years.
Facilitating this education to job match was the cen-
tralized graduate job placement plan which lasted from
the 1950s through the 1980s and became prevalent in
the 1960s and the 1970s. The essential pillar of the plan
was the party state’s rigid control over job assignments
for graduates, and its final political decision on how
and where to place skilled manpower. The important
‘Decision on Reforming Length of Schooling’ (guanyu
gaige xuezhi de jueding, 关于改革学制的决定) released
in August 1951 underlined the job placement plan of
university graduates by government. In the process of
state planning, universities and colleges reported the
supply of prospective graduates. Work units reported
their specific demands for labor to the overseeing depart-
ments. The overseeing departments transmitted the
supply-and-demand information to the state planning
department through the hierarchical structure. The state
planning department subsequently developed a draft for
the national manpower plan and gained the approval
of the State Council. Following that, the approved plan
was delivered from the top down to local departments
and then to universities and work units. This process
of job allocation under state planning left little room
for graduates, tertiary universities, and work units to
negotiate. In 1952, the plan adhered to the central gov-
ernment’s allocations of labor to premier construction
projects and to remote regions to aid the nation’s indus-
trialization and state-building strategies. The core val-
ue of the centralized graduate job allocation plan lay in
efficiently extracting and mobilizing specialized human
resources in the face of the daunting obstacles of social-
ist reconstruction tasks, economic hardship, and a des-
perate shortage of skilled labor in the early years of the
People’s Republic of China. It fostered job-worker match-
ing by promoting matches between university courses
and the requirements of particular jobs and by acquir-
ing employment information on both the supply and
demand sides. The central government also sought to
enhance the geographical balance by deploying human
resources to rural and remote regions (Agelasto, 1998,
pp. 261–263). For individual graduates, the plan guided
their occupational choices and helped internalize their
belief in the state’s job allocation plan via political mobi-
lization and propaganda.
5.3. Being Selected into Party and Government Systems:
Four Modernizations and ‘Reds and Experts’
In the People’s Republic of China’s first 30 years, the
newly established regime produced a large number of
highly educated and technically trained experts through
the expansion of education and placed them in relat-
ed professional positions under the centralized graduate
job allocation plan. In terms of career progression, for
technocrats in provincial leadership in the 1990s, 72.12%
began to assume political positions during the period
of 1980–1985, about 20 to 30 years after graduating
from college. Why and how did these technical experts
move away from professional career lines and hold pow-
er in the party and government systems? At first glance,
socioeconomic development helps to explain the rising
demands for technical experts and the regime’s reliance
upon them for industrialization and modernization pro-
grams. But that is an insufficient explanation for the high
number of career transitions from professional occupa-
tions to elite positions within a tightly controlled and
fiercely competitive hierarchy. The following paragraphs
will examine the supply and demand for cadres in the
1980s by analyzing the historic convergence of the retire-
ment of revolutionaries and the cadre policy of the Four
Modernizations. A complementary perspective will be
described to explain the emergence of technocrats in the
1980s and their rise in the 1990s. It is closely related
to the political impetus and considerations of reds and
experts for paramount leaders in a new era of politics
and policies.
After the chaotic years of the Cultural Revolution,
the revolutionary veterans were rehabilitated and seized
political power. They managed to regain legitimacy and
popular confidence in the Chinese Communist Party and
to restructure the nation’s socioeconomic and political
systems by adopting pragmatic and incremental reform
strategies. One of the formidable problems that both-
ered these born-again reformers was the death and poor
health of the aging revolutionary veterans. As indicated
by Cheng Li and Lynn White (2003, p. 566), the average
age was 64.6 for the 11th CC members and 62 for the
12th CC members. The average age was 73.8 for mem-
bers of the 12th Politburo Standing Committee and 71.8
for the 12th Politburo members. From the very outset
of the reform, Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun mentioned
on different occasions that old revolutionaries were ill-
suited for the new tasks of economic development due
to aging. In 1977, in a meeting with vice-ministerial-
level leaders from the party, government, and military
systems, Deng openly doubted whether half of them
were able to work in the office for eight hours every
day. While he pointed out their vast revolutionary and
work experiences, he counseled that they should be
acutely aware of their lack of energy. In the report of
Promoting and Training Young and Middle-Age Cadres
is the Top Priority (tiba peiyang zhongqingnian ganbu
shi dangwuzhiji,提拔培养中青年干部是当务之急) in May
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1981, Chen Yun (1981a) indicated the following observa-
tions about the age structure of leaders. Like the lead-
ing cadres of ministries, the top leaders at the provin-
cial,municipal, and prefectural Chinese Communist Party
were largely over 60, and a large number of cadres
were over 70. They were positioned high in the power
hierarchy and burdened with heavy workloads. These
senior leaders were ill-equipped to meet the demanding
and sophisticated task of running a modern state. They
could not afford to work hard for a prolonged period
of time. A substantial number of them kept working in
spite of illness and eventually died fromoverwork. In July
1981, Chen Yun (1981b) focused on the issue of pow-
er succession in terms of a shortage of eligible succes-
sors. He delivered the speech ‘Promoting Thousands of
Young andMiddle-Aged Cadres’ (chengqianshangwande
tiba zhongqingnian ganbu, 成千上万地提拔中青年干部).
In addition, Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun repeatedly
emphasized the Chinese Communist Party’s determina-
tion to eliminate ‘three sorts of people’ (san zhong ren,
三种人) from the cadre corps. In August 1980, Deng
Xiaoping (1980) made an important speech, ‘Reforming
the Party-State Leadership System’ (dang he guojia ling-
dao zhidu de gaige,党和国家领导制度的改革), and iden-
tified the ‘three sorts of people’ as the followers of the
Gang of Four, those with the radical ideology of faction-
alism, and rebels. Deng stressed that they should be
removed from office and excluded from Chinese power
circles, as Chen Yun did in his 1981 speech.
On the eve of the sweeping post-Mao reforms, state
leaders decided to recruit and promote young and
middle-aged cadres in the context of large-scale socioe-
conomic and macropolitical transformations. The retire-
ment of revolutionary veterans and the restructuring of
cadre corps created a wide range of vacancies within the
political hierarchies. At the same time, maintaining the
regime’s stability and accelerating modernization accen-
tuated the need to co-opt highly trained specialists into
the ruling elite. To bring young bloods into the party
and bureaucracies, the state leaders overcame the struc-
tural barriers of cadre recruitment criteria and political
resistance from revolutionaries by clarifying the issues of
‘why,’ ‘who’ and ‘how,’ to promote in cadre selection.
Promoting young cadres caused major concerns
among revolutionaries’ who had reasonable anxiety
about their young successors’ lack of experience. Deng
Xiaoping and Chen Yun compared young cadres with rev-
olutionary veterans and explained the regime’s imper-
ative to recruit cadres for three reasons. First, veter-
an cadres became mature and independent by extend-
ing their revolutionary and occupational experience par-
ticularly during their formative years. Likewise, young
cadres were expected to acquire in-depth career experi-
ence from administrative practices and training. Second,
both aging revolutionaries and young cadres seemed
inexperienced in the face of the new tasks and obsta-
cles arising from the modernization and reform pro-
cesses. Both of them were vulnerable to failure. Third,
young and middle-aged cadres were energetic and pro-
fessional and possessed technical knowledge and exper-
tise. More importantly, they largely came from the birth
cohorts of the 1930s and the 1940s and had bitter
memories of the Cultural Revolution: “As the Cultural
Revolution grown-ups, they understand the views and
behaviors of the youth in the early years of the Cultural
Revolution” (Chen, 1981b, p. 300). Chen Yun (1981b,
p. 299) declared:
At present, several veteran cadres are still irrational
in promoting the younger generation and fail to rec-
ognize the urgent need for cadre selection. It would
be detrimental to the Party if unqualified candidates
were ultimately placed in leadership positions only
after elder leaders cracked up.
Deng Xiaoping (1981, p. 384) also warned of the urgen-
cy of recruiting young and middle-aged cadres: “This is a
strategic issue in determining the political fortune of the
Party and current leaders. Another catastrophe following
the Cultural Revolution would come if power succession
was not completed in three or five years.”
In deciding who to promote to authority posi-
tions, the state leaders emphasized political integrity
and expertise. Their cadre policy initiative, the Four
Modernizations, was enshrined in the Party Constitution
in 1982. It aimed to select younger, politically reli-
able, well-educated, and technically professional cadres.
A candidate for political promotion could be graduate of
a vocational school or a college (dazhuan, 大专) in the
postliberation era, technicians with over 10-year senior-
ity in professional occupations, young and middle-aged
cadres without college education but with deep practical
experience, as well as sent-down youths and talents with
self-learning skills. Deng Xiaoping (1980, p. 325) summed
up the selection criteria of potentially qualified candi-
dates: “The young and middle-aged cadres with political
loyalty, diligence, and specialized knowledge are widely
positioned in every walk of life. They spread across var-
ious localities and divisions. The central issue is that we
have not discovered and promoted them.”
In July 1981, Deng Xiaoping (1981, p. 386) made a
brief comment on political reliability and meritocracy for
college graduates in the 1960s while discussing how to
rejuvenate the leadership: “They are relatively profes-
sional and capable. As college graduates several years
before the Cultural Revolution, a vast majority of them
are politically reliable. They are by and large 40 years old.”
He argued and provided a specific example of deputy
director of the Second Automobile Factory, who com-
pleted his college education one or two years before
the Cultural Revolution. He took the opposite position in
radical ideology and policies and was suppressed shortly
after the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution: “Suffering
from suppression in the course of the Cultural Revolution
is recognized as one of the political criteria,” Deng (1981,
p. 386) declared:
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Is he an expert? He has already assumed the leading
post of deputy director in a large factory. Why could
he not become an expert if receiving training in par-
ty schools and possessing more diverse career experi-
ence by holding other posts?
From a career perspective, technically-trained college
graduates in the 1950s and the 1960s were turned into
technical experts with lengthy professional work expe-
rience through the 1970s and the 1980s. Were they
matched close enough to the cadre policy of the Four
Modernizations so that they could constitute a pool of
qualified candidates for political office during the mas-
sive leadership reshuffles of the reform era, turning out
to be the technocrats of the 1990s?
For youthful rejuvenation, the average age for tech-
nocrats upon entry into public service was 39.65 in the
1990s. Among them, those aged under 30 accounted for
11.14%, between 30 and 39, 30.48%, between 40 and
49, 52.19%, and over 50, 6.19%. In terms of specialized
knowledge and professional competency, they benefited
from educational expansion and received the technical
training of a full-time college education. They were allo-
cated to professional occupations and stayed at the SOEs
for over ten years under the state planning of manpow-
er. 74.50% of them possessed professional titles such
as engineer, economist, and the like. For 44.91% of the
1990s technocrats, their first job in the political system
was closely related to their educational credentials and
professional career experience.
For political reliability, 98.10% of the 1990s tech-
nocrats joined the Chinese Communist Party. Of these
Chinese Communist Party technocrats, 96.72% became
Chinese Communist Party members before working in
the party or government systems. In terms of the tim-
ing of joining the Chinese Communist Party, 41.17%
were admitted to the Chinese Communist Party before
the Cultural Revolution. With respect to the age of
joining the Chinese Communist Party, 56.75% became
Chinese Communist Party members between the ages
20 and 29. For the technocrats joining the Chinese
Communist Party before beginning public service, the
average Chinese Communist Party seniority was 12.99
years. 55.75% had Chinese Communist Party seniority of
over 10 years.
In addition to Chinese Communist Party member-
ship and seniority, another salient criterion for political
reliability was party work at SOEs, colleges, or research
institutes. Empirically, 57.09% of the 1990s technocrats
took charge of partywork before occupying political posi-
tions. For example, they concurrently worked as head
of the SOE and party secretary. The average party work
tenure was 7.92 years before entering public service.
To be specific, the shortest tenure was five months and
the longest tenure was 22 years. Looking at the typical
career pattern, 50.90% of the 1990s technocrats had a
career pattern of party work with an average seniority of
24.78 years.
As a final note, political screening was required for
every college application and job assignment in the
1950s and the 1960s. Political screening focused on fam-
ily origins, family members, individual class and political
status, main social ties, rewards and penalties, investiga-
tion results, and so on. Documents related to that politi-
cal screening were an important part of every graduate’s
dossier for job allocation purposes. In this respect, col-
lege graduates working at the SOEs were politically reli-
able because they had already been vigorously screened.
In summary, this analysis of educational backgrounds,
professional occupations, party membership, and party
work experience provides a compelling explanation for
why technical specialists working in the 1970s and the
1980s fit the recruitment criteria under the cadre poli-
cy of Four the Modernizations and subsequently steered
their careers to party and administrative systems and
political power. From this perspective, it is possible to see
why they could be regarded as both Red and expert and
therefore eligible or even ideal candidates for authority
positions when state leaders reached a consensus about
promoting young and middle-aged cadres in the 1980s.
6. Conclusions
This article presented an analytical account of China’s
provincial leadership transformation. It focused on the
rise of technocrats in the 1990s and examined their
major life transitions. Career transitions included admis-
sion to university, moving from college to work, and
then to jobs in the party or in administrative posts.
It also mapped out the interactions among individual
career opportunities, the composition of the group, and
the shifts in state policy that directly affected them.
For technocrats in the 1990s, their educational and
career opportunities were significantly shaped bymacro-
sociopolitical transformation, such as the expansion of
education, faculty restructuring, the graduate job allo-
cation plan which started in the 1950s, and the retire-
ment of revolutionary veterans in the 1970s and the
1980s. In short, they were the right people, in the right
place, at the right time. The party state sought to co-opt
these technical experts into the power hierarchy in order
to legitimize its rule by fostering economic and techno-
logical development. More importantly for purposes of
this study, the party state sought to maintain a delicate
balance between cadre selection criteria and the pool
of viable political candidates who were educated and
worked within the existing career mobility structure.
For those reasons, this study’s analyses support the
political technocracy theory: There was an alliance of
technocrats and career bureaucrats. The emergence of
technocratic leadership does not necessarily represent a
preference for technical expertise over political loyalty in
cadre selection.
As observed in this study, technocrats in the 1990s
were thoroughly Red and deeply expert per se, possess-
ing both educational and political credentials. This empir-
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ical evidence supports Zang’s argument. That is, despite
a political alliance between bureaucrats and technocrats,
party bureaucrats only recruited “the technocrats who
express loyalty to the regime and the orthodox ideol-
ogy” (Zang, 1993, pp. 802–803). However, the ascent
of technocrats in the 1990s by no means signaled the
replacement of generalists with specialists in Chinese
politics. Technocrats cooperatedwith career bureaucrats
and had a slight advantage in terms of numbers in the
1990s. For that reason, technocrats appeared to be the
backbone of Chinese provincial leadership even though
career bureaucrats still sat at the apex of the power
hierarchy. After 2000, career bureaucrats came back to
prominence as the percentage of technocrats decreased.
With the incremental institutionalization of cadre recruit-
ment and promotion, particularly the emphasis on step-
by-step promotion, generalists were positioned advanta-
geously in very fierce political competition because they
got acquainted with the functioning and operation of
party and bureaucratic systems and possessedmanageri-
al and coordinated competency as well as diverse admin-
istrative practices.
As the regime’s agenda was shifted to econom-
ic development, industrialization, and modernization,
the demand for technical specialists became greater.
However, this was an insufficient condition for techno-
cratic dominance. Technocrats did not come to promi-
nence in the 1950swhen the party state promoted social-
ist reconstruction and Communist-style industrialization.
And, they did not come to prominence the early years
of the 21st century when the party state launched its
growth strategy of innovation nation and the number of
college students studying science, technology, engineer-
ing, and mathematics increased dramatically.
This article argues that turning technically trained
experts into technocrats was the political choice of
reformers, but this choice was significantly conditioned
by the supply of cadre candidates. As to the cadre
corps before the Cultural Revolution, old revolutionaries
passed away or retired to the second line. For the cadre
corps after the Cultural Revolution, the ‘three sorts of
people’ stepped down from political office and unqual-
ified cadres were transferred outside the party systems
and government bureaucracies. Additionally, the general
population was poorly educated, particularly when edu-
cational institutions and training systems were largely
paralyzed due to the ten-year period of chaos during the
Cultural Revolution. In this historical context, the pool
of potential cadres inside or outside the political system
was extremely limited.
At the same time, the basis of legitimacy for run-
ning a modern state changed. The supreme leaders shift-
ed cadre recruitment to consider both political reliabil-
ity and such meritocratic standards as education and
professional competency. By considering the supply and
demand of prospective cadres, they had no choice but
to expand the source and scope of cadre selection along
the new recruitment criteria. They had to turn to can-
didates who graduated before the Cultural Revolution.
Educational reform before the Cultural Revolution pro-
duced a large number of technically trained college grad-
uates. Under the graduate job allocation plan, they were
assigned to technical positions at SOEs and accumulat-
ed professional career experience. They largely escaped
the Cultural Revolution’s political purges and repression.
Their career opportunities for transfers and advance-
ment arose because they were politically loyal, highly
educated, and professionally competent. It is not the
specialty of science and engineering vis-à-vis humanities
and social sciences that conferred significant competi-
tive advantage on the technical specialists. The underly-
ing force of co-opting technical specialists into the ruling
elite was a dilemma between the imperative of youth-
ful rejuvenation and the lack of politically reliable and
well-educated cadres at the critical juncture of a per-
sonnel reshuffle. As the cadres, and the public in gener-
al, have become more educated, personnel bottlenecks
have been resolved and technical experts are no longer
considered a major source of cadres. As for China, the
short-termemergence of technocratic leadership is pecu-
liar to the early years of the post-Cultural Revolution era,
spanning from the late 1970s through the 1990s. This
data does not suggest that technocrats have grown into
a strongly competitive and cohesive political force with
a shared ideology and group identity. Nor does it mean
that China is taking the technocratic road.
Drawing upon data about a group of technocrats in
provincial leadership in the 1990s, this article has provid-
ed an important lens through which a link among individ-
uals’ career transitions and socioeconomic and macrop-
olitical transformations can be understood. In explaining
the rise of the 1990s technocrats, this article has direct-
ed attention away from the influence of socioeconomic
factors to the impact of state policies as well as the polit-
ical preferences, impetus, and constraints in the cadre
selection process. The rise of the 1990s technocrats was
not an isolated phenomenon or peculiar to China. It also
occurred in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, Mexico,
Chile, Taiwan, and other countries. Comparative stud-
ies would provide interesting observations and convinc-
ing explanations for this seemingly common technocrat-
ic turn.
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